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Centrality measures such as the degree, k-shell, or eigenvalue central-
ity can identify a network’s most influential nodes, but are rarely use-
fully accurate in quantifying the spreading power of the vast majority
of nodes which are not highly influential. The spreading power of all
network nodes is better explained by considering, from a continuous-
time epidemiological perspective, the distribution of the force of in-
fection each node generates. The resulting metric, the Expected
Force (ExF), accurately quantifies node spreading power under all
primary epidemiological models across a wide range of archetypi-
cal human contact networks. When node power is low, influence is
a function of neighbor degree. As power increases, a node’s own
degree becomes more important. The strength of this relationship
is modulated by network structure, being more pronounced in nar-
row, dense networks typical of social networking and weakening in
broader, looser association networks such as Internet webpages. The
ExF can be computed independently for individual nodes, making it
applicable for networks whose adjacency matrix is dynamic, not well
specified, or overwhelmingly large.
Spreading power | Influence | Complex networks | Centrality
Abbreviations: FoI, force of infection; ExF, expected force
Networks have become the premier approach to describingspreading processes such as epidemics or information dif-
fusion because they express the heterogeneity of interactions
characteristic of many human activities [1]. Thirty years of
innovation have refined our ability to identify nodes which are
highly influential to the outcome of almost any spreading pro-
cess on a given network via features such as betweenness cen-
trality [2, 3], eigenvalue centrality [4], degree [5], or k-shell [6].
Yet highly influential nodes are rare by definition, and the
just listed measures are not informative for the vast majority
of network nodes. These centrality measures only rank nodes
and are not designed to quantify spreading power [6, 7, 8].
While the rankings accurately identify the few highly influen-
tial nodes, they can considerably underestimate the spreading
power of non-hub nodes [9]. Nor do these rankings incorpo-
rate the dynamics of spreading processes [10, 11]. This leaves
open the question of quantifying the spreading power of the
vastly more numerous non-highly influential nodes, and in-
deed understanding the nature of node spreading power it-
self. As highly influential nodes only rarely originate spread-
ing processes, be they pathogenic disease [12, 13], innovative
ideas [14], or chatter [15], there is deep intellectual hunger
and practical utility in accurately measuring and understand-
ing the spreading power of each individual node in a network.
A node’s spreading power is the force with which it can push
a spreading process to the rest of the network. More precisely,
in a susceptible-infected (SI) spreading process without recov-
ery, which inevitably reaches the entire connected component
of the network, the spreading power of the seed node predicts
the delay before half (or some other large percentage of) the
network is reached. In a process with recovery to either the
susceptible (SIS) or immune (SIR) state, spreading power cor-
relates to the probability that a node can seed an epidemic
given that the ratio of the per-contact transmission rate to
the rate of recovery allows for, but does not guarantee, an
epidemic. When this ratio exceeds this critical range, the dy-
namics approach the SI system as a limiting case.
Several approaches to quantifying the spreading power of
all nodes have recently been proposed, including the accessibil-
ity [16, 17], the dynamic influence [11], and the impact [7] (See
supplementary Note S1). These extend earlier approaches to
measuring centrality by explicitly incorporating spreading dy-
namics, and have been shown to be both distinct from previous
centrality measures and more highly correlated with epidemic
outcomes [7, 11, 18]. Yet they retain the common foundation
of the more usual approaches to centrality, counting walks on
the network [10, 19, 20, 21]. As the walks are counted using
powers of the adjacency matrix, spread is observed only in
discrete time.
Epidemiology, in contrast, studies the continuous-time dy-
namics of the force of infection (FoI), defined as the current
rate at which susceptible nodes are becoming infected [22]. In
network models, the FoI is directly proportional to the current
number of edges between infected and susceptible nodes. The
critical distinction between FoI and walks is that the FoI is
determined by the number of infected-susceptible edges, in-
dependent of their distance from the seed node. The criti-
cal distinction between continuous- and discrete-time is that
continuous-time allows resolution down to the first few trans-
missions, a level not easily expressed in a discrete-time frame-
work where multiple transmissions may occur at each time
step (Note S2). The distinction is acute, as the number of
events per time step grows at a double-exponential rate in
scale-free networks [23], the type of network most represen-
Significance
Memes, innovations, diseases, invasive species– many socially
relevant phenonenon are types of spreading processes. Despite
the ubiquity and social impact of such processes, and the com-
mon use of network models to understand their dynamics, we
still do not have a theoretically sound approach for quantifing
how structural features of the source node influence the outcome
of such processes. By taking a fundamentally new approach to
defining node influence, the current work teaches us that influ-
ence is a balance between self and neighbor degree. Nodes with
low influence gain what strength they have from their neighbors
onward connectivity, with the balance shifting to self degree as
influence increases. This shift is accentuated by the higher tri-
angle count in denser networks.
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tative of human social structures [24] and perhaps even life
itself [25].
The continuous-time epidemiological perspective suggests
that node spreading power can be accurately quantified by
appropriately summarising the distribution of the number of
infected-susceptible edges after a small number of transmission
events arising from a seed node in an otherwise fully suscep-
tible network; that is, by the expected FoI generated by that
node. We here propose such a measure, named the Expected
Force (ExF), and show that it outperforms the accessibility,
k-shell, and eigenvalue centrality (Note S3) in predicting epi-
demic outcomes in SI, SIS, and SIR spreading processes, in
both discrete- and continuous-time. The ExF’s basis in lo-
cal neighborhood structure means that it is applicable even
when the full adjacency matrix is either unknown or inher-
ently unknowable. The metric naturally extends to weighted
and directed networks. Most importantly, the ExF is able to
illuminate the factors responsible for node spreading power.
Definition and validation
The ExF is a node property derived from local network topol-
ogy, independent of the rest of the network or any specific
spreading process. It is formally defined as follows. Consider
a network with one infected node i and all remaining nodes
susceptible. Enumerate all possible clusters J = 1, . . . , |J | of
infected nodes after x transmission events, assuming no recov-
ery (See Fig 1). Generally speaking, x = 2 is sufficient and
assumed for the rest of this manuscript. Hence J includes
all possible combinations of i plus two nodes at distance one
from i, and i plus one node at distance one and one at dis-
tance two. The enumeration is over all possible orderings of
the transmission events. Two neighbors of the seed (a and b)
form two clusters ([i → a, i → b] and [i → b, i → a]) or, if
a and b also share an edge, four clusters. Define the degree
of a cluster of nodes dj as the number of edges connecting
nodes inside the cluster to nodes outside. After two transmis-
sions without recovery, the FoI of a spreading process seeded
from node i is a discrete random variable taking a value in
(d1, . . . , dJ), allowing for the proportionality constant equal
to the transmission rate of the process. The expected FoI can
be approximated by the entropy of the dj after normalisation
ExF (i) = −
J∑
j=1
d¯j log(d¯j) [1]
where i refers to the seed node and d¯k =
dk
ΣJdj
, ∀k ∈ J . The
entropy is needed for generating the expected value due to
the extreme variability in the shape, number of modes, and
number of terms in the distributions of dj for different seed
nodes.
Setting x = 2 is recommended but not required. Increasing
the number of transmissions beyond two adds very little infor-
mation while increasing the computational cost (Note S5), in
agreement with other proposed spreading power metrics [7, 11]
and consistent with the decaying influence of longer paths in
the calculations of the eigenvalue, subgraph, and related cen-
tralities [4, 8, 20, 21]. In certain cases, however, it may be
desirable to consider more transmission events. For example,
a node at the end of a chain of length two can only form one
transmission cluster of size two, hence its ExF is zero. Com-
paring two such nodes requires setting x = 3, in which case a
subscript can be used for clarity (e.g. ExF3).
One modification may be in order for SIS/SIR processes,
inspired by the following. Imagine a node with degree one
connected to a hub. While such a node will have a high ExF,
its chance of realizing this force depends entirely on transmit-
Fig. 1. This network will be in one of eight possible states after two transmis-
sions from the the seed node (red). Two states are illustrated, where the seed has
transmitted to the two orange nodes along the solid black edges. Each state has an
associated number of (dashed orange) edges to susceptible nodes (blue), the cluster
degree. States containing two neighbors of the seed can form in two ways or, if they
are part of a triangle, four ways. The eight network states associated with the pic-
tured seed node arrise from thirteen possible transmission clusters. The ExF of the
seed node is the entropy of the distribution of the normalized cluster degree over all
possible transmission clusters.
ting to the hub before recovery. Such nodes are common in
dense social networks. For example, 84% of the 225K nodes in
an EU institution email network [26] have degree one. In such
networks, it may be helpful to multiply the ExF by the log of
the seed node’s degree after first rescaling the seed’s degree by
some factor α > 1.
ExFM (i) = log(αdeg(i))ExF (i) [2]
The rescaling is motivated in that the log of one is zero, and
the ExFM is most informative in networks where many nodes
have degree one. The rescaling factor must be greater than
one, and should also be small to avoid overpowering the influ-
ence of the degree. In the rest of this manuscript, we use α = 2,
the smallest integer which satisfies these criteria. Computing
the ExFM for α ranging from 1.0001 to 16 does not substan-
tively alter the metric, as all such variations show correlations
greater than 0.99 to ExFM computed with α = 2 (Note S6).
Running times are discussed in Note S7. Example code
providing an implementation of the ExF is available at
https://github.com/glennlawyer/ExpectedForce.
Correlation to epidemic outcomes. We measure correlations
between ExF and epidemic outcomes on five families of sim-
ulated networks chosen such that their densities and degree
distributions span a wide range of human contact structures
(Methods, and Table S4). One hundred random networks of
1,000 nodes are generated in each family. Further comparison
is made using a suite of twenty four empirical networks rang-
ing from 1,133 to 855,800 nodes (Table S5). Epidemic out-
comesare observed by simulating multiple epidemics in both
continuous and discrete time from a number of seed nodes in
each network. Correlations are measured between these out-
comes and the ExF, ExFM , accessibility, eigenvalue centrality,
and the k-shell of the seed nodes (Note S3).
The ExF is highly predictive of all epidemic outcomes on
all networks tested, simulated and empirical. Mean correla-
tion to SI process outcomes is 83% on simulated and 74% on
empirical networks. For processes with recovery, mean corre-
lation is 91% on simulated and 82% on empirical networks.
Standard deviations over the one hundred simulated networks
in each family are typically 0.02 − 0.03. The 95% confidence
bounds on empirical networks are in the same range. In al-
most all cases the ExF significantly outperforms the accessi-
bility, eigenvalue centrality, and the k-shell (difference in mean
correlations greater than the standard deviation of the higher
mean). The ExF is only bested in the following three cases,
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Fig. 2. Observed correlations between metrics and epidemic outcomes in each network family. The ExF and ExFM (orange shades) are consistently strong, with mean
correlations greater than 0.85 and small variance. The other measures (k-shell, eigenvalue centrality, and accessibility, blue-green shades) show both lower mean values and
higher variance. Each violin summarizes correlations computed on 100 simulated networks. Spreading processes (x axis) are suffixed to indicate simulations in continuous (-C)
or discrete (-D) time.
each time by the k-shell: discrete time SIR processes in the
simulated Astrophysics (0.97 vs 0.92) and Facebook (0.97 vs
0.94) networks and the SI process on the “email-EUAll” net-
work (0.50 vs 0.41). The performance of the k-shell was sur-
prisingly strong, given that two previous studies by indepen-
dent groups have observed rather poor performance for this
metric [11, 18]. The observed correlations on 100 simulated
networks in each family are shown in Fig. 2 (also Table S6).
The measured correlations and their standard errors for all
empirical networks are shown in Fig. 3 (also Tables S7-9).
The ExF’s predictive power is robust to variation in net-
work structure. The theory behind the ExFM suggests
that the ExF might perform less well for SIS/SIR pro-
cesses on denser networks, yet mean correlation for continu-
ous time SIS processes is barely changed between the loose
Pareto/Amazon networks (0.93/0.95) and the dense Astro-
physics/Facebook networks (0.92/0.90). As expected, the
predictive power of the ExFM improves on the denser net-
works (mean correlations: Pareto/Amazon 0.89/0.92, Astro-
physics/Facebook 0.94/0.95). The accuracy of the accessibil-
ity metric, in contrast, collapses for all spreading processes
on the dense networks (mean correlation over all spreading
processes: Pareto/Amazon 0.74/0.90, Astrophysics/Facebook
0.28/0.20.) A previous analysis which observed similar poor
performance for the accessibility on dense networks concluded
that spreading processes seeded from nodes with low acces-
sibility are not capable of entering the epidemic phase [18].
Our results show this is not the case, as these nodes have a
small yet observable epidemic potential which the ExF is able
to capture and quantify. Performance of the k-shell and the
eigenvalue centrality is also strongly influenced by network
structure. For SIS/SIR processes, both showed higher mean
and sharply reduced variance on the denser networks. In an
interesting contrast, the k-shell’s predictive power for SI pro-
cesses is reduced in denser networks. The eigenvalue central-
ity’s performance also varies by spreading process, showing its
best performance on discrete time SIS models– though again
this variation is modulated by network density. Two other
independent groups have observed that relationships between
centrality rankings and epidemic outcomes are strongly influ-
enced by network structure and the parameters of the spread-
ing processes [9, 7], leading the authors of [9] to conclude that
these measures severely underestimate the epidemic impact of
structurally peripheral nodes.
Weighted graphs. The ExF generalizes to graphs with
weighted edges, where we assume the edge weights correspond
to per-edge transmission likelihoods. Use these weights to cal-
culate the probability of each way that each cluster could oc-
cur, and re-define the cluster degree as the sum of all edge
weights leading out from that cluster. The extension to di-
rected graphs is also straightforward; limit the enumeration
to edges leading from an infected to a susceptible node.
We test this generalization by computing the weighted and
unweighted ExF on 1,000 node networks with Pareto (1,2.3)
degree distributions and edge weights chosen according to one
of the following three distributions: uniformly distributed be-
tween one and three, uniformly distributed between one and
ten, and exponentially distributed with unit rate, weights
rounded up to the nearest integer. Fifty networks were simu-
lated for each distribution of edge weights. Correlation be-
tween the weighted and unweighted ExF was greater than
0.99 for all network edge weighting distributions tested. As
Footline Author PNAS Issue Date Volume Issue Number 3
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Fig. 3. Observed correlations and 95% confidence intervals between metrics and epidemic outcomes on the 24 empirical networks. The ExF and ExFM (orange shades)
show strong performance, consistently outperforming the other metrics (k-shell, eigenvalue centrality, and accessibility when computed, blue-green shades). The suffix “-D”
indicates spreading processes simulated in discrete time.
expected from the tight correlation, the weighted and un-
weighted ExF showed no meaningful difference in predictive
ability, which remained high. Observed correlations between
node ExF and epidemic potential in discrete-time SIS pro-
cesses were 0.88/0.89 ±0.03 (unweighted/weighted ExF) un-
der the uniform-3 scheme, 0.83/0.04 ±0.03 under the uniform-
10 scheme, and 0.80/0.79 ±0.05 under the exponentially dis-
tributed weighting scheme.
Discussion
The ExF predicts all types of epidemic outcomes with high ac-
curacy over a broad range of network structures and spreading
processes. The low variance in observed correlations over mul-
tiple simulated network and epidemic models shows that the
measure is robust, as do the tight confidence bounds on em-
pirical networks. What, then, does it tell us about the nature
of node spreading power? The definition of the ExF implies
that spreading power is determined by both the degree of the
node and the degree of its neighbors, and that the relative in-
fluence of these two factors is different for nodes of low versus
high spreading power. Weaker nodes gain what strength they
have from their neighbors onward connectivity, whereas more
influential nodes get their strength from their large number of
connections. These relationships are accentuated by network
density.
This is a result of the combinatorics behind the enumera-
tion over transmission clusters. Clusters are formed either by
choosing two neighbors from the first geodisc, a term which
grows approximately quadratricly in node degree, or by each
path leading to the second geodisc, a term which grows ap-
proximately linearly in the size of this disk. Generally speak-
ing, the second geodisc is much larger than the first. Hence
spreading power is determined largely by terms from the sec-
ond geodisc until the quadratic growth of the influence of the
first overtakes it. The influence of network density reflects
the ExF’s sensitivity to network motifs such as triangles and
squares. Each triangle touching the seed node contributes
four terms to the enumeration J , meaning the contribution of
the first geodisc grows faster than quadratically. Sensitivity
4 www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.0709640104 Footline Author
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Fig. 4. Plotting ExF (x-axis) versus node degree (orange), the sum of the degree
of all neighbors (blue), and the sum of the degree of all neighbors at distance 2 (green)
shows that for nodes with low ExF, the neighbor’s degree has strong correlation to
ExF, while for nodes with high ExF their own degree is more closely correlated ways.
The result is accentuated in denser collaboration networks in comparison to more
diffuse Pareto networks.
to squares and triangles is also granted by the entropy term.
These motifs, which are more common towards the cores of
dense networks, reduce the disparity of the cluster degree dis-
tributions thus increasing the ExF (Fig. 4).
The approach taken by the ExF is fundamentally differ-
ent than that taken by most centrality measures. Centrality
measures typically set out to produce a ranking which iden-
tifies the most influential nodes in the network, under the
assumption that highly influential nodes are those with the
maximal sum of some type of walk [7, 10, 19, 20, 21]. The
choice of the appropriate type, scaling, and length of walks
contain implicit assumptions regarding network flows [10], co-
hesion structure [19], and/or other topological characteristics
of the network [20, 21]. The k-shell is a slight exception, as
it was originally intended to precipitate out the most cohesive
regions of the network rather than to explicitly rank nodes
within cohesive regions [27], yet it is now recognized as one of
the best centrality measures for identifying a network’s most
influential spreaders [6]. Spreading power metrics generalize
the walk counting framework by explicitly including transmis-
sion probabilities when scaling the walks [7, 11, 16, 17]. The
question not asked is if the type, scaling, and lengths of walks
best suited to identifying the most important nodes applies
equally well to the rest of the network. To the extent that the
optimal choice of factors depends on network topology, then
the difference in topology between core and periphery suggests
that choices well suited to the core are seldom appropriate for
the remainder of the network.
Both the combinatorics behind the ExF and the walk count-
ing behind most centrality measures agree that influential
nodes are those which combine high degree with a preponder-
ance of influential neighbors. The ExF has high rank correla-
tion with both the eigenvalue centrality and the k-shell (0.62-
0.92 across the simulated network families (Note S8 and Table
S2). Likewise, the ExF has 60-90% agreement with the eigen-
value centrality on the top ten network nodes and 100% agree-
ment with the k-shell. The difference between walk counting
and the ExF is that the ExF adapts the relative influence
of different walks and walk lengths based on local connectiv-
ity, whereas approaches based on functions of the adjacency
matrix apply a fixed protocol. The eigenvalue centrality is
weighted node degree, where the weights are the importance
of the neighbors [4, 8]. But the eigenvalue centrality is strictly
a global measure, unable to distinguish more subtle variations
in local structure [8, 21]. The k-shell erodes node degree to
match the number of neighbors with similar degree. Since
this discards remaining information on the individual degree
of nodes within a common shell, the accuracy of its predic-
tions is heavily influenced by the number of shells in the net-
work. The accessibility combines node and neighbor degree
into a measure of the number of nodes likely to be reached by
walks of a given length [17]. But this approach has difficulties
quantifying nodes in dense, small diameter networks, which
accentuate differences between core and peripheral topology.
Calculation of the ExF depends only on the local topology.
This allows epidemic outcomes on the whole network to be
predicted with high accuracy even when only a small portion
of the network is known (Note S9). It is rare for the full struc-
ture of a real network to be fully known; typically the network
structure is inferred from indirect, incomplete, and often bi-
ased observations. Specification of an adjacency matrix is even
more difficult when the underlying network is dynamic. In
contrast, estimates of eigenvalue centrality fluctuate depend-
ing on which nodes are sampled [28]. Both the pagerank [29]
and the k-shell [30] are highly sensitive to pertubations in net-
work topology, making them unreliable for incomplete or noisy
systems. Reliance on a local network does, however, lead to
one weakness in the ExF. A network may contain large but
disparate communities. Here, a node serving as a bridge be-
tween two communities might be able to spread a process to
the entire network with more force than a node far from the
bridge, even when the second node has more (local) spreading
power than the bridging node. The ExF’s local nature makes
it blind to these larger topological constraints on spread.
The ExF is strongly correlated to epidemic outcome, out-
performing existing metrics of node spreading power and cen-
trality. The measure depends only on local network topology,
allowing its use in dynamic as well as static networks. For
most nodes, the most important determinant of their spread-
ing power is the sum of their neighbors’ degree. As node power
grows, so does the importance of the node’s own degree. This
relationship is accentuated in denser networks.
Methods
Epidemic simulations and outcomes. The epidemic outcome
for SI process is the time to half coverage (tthc); the time un-
til exactly half the nodes in the network are infected. This
is measured at each seed node (Note S10) by simulating 100
spreading processes and fitting the observed tthc from all sim-
ulations to a gamma distribution. Simulations are run in con-
tinuous time, with the time of the next transmission event
drawn from an exponential distribution with rate equal to the
current number of infected-susceptible edges. Discrete time
does not provide sufficient resolution for SI processes.
Spreading processes with recovery are of interest when the
ratio of transmissibility to recovery for the process β is in the
critical range which allows for but does not guarantee an epi-
demic. The epidemic outcome is a node’s epidemic potential
(EPo), the probability that a given node can seed an epi-
demic (Note S11). The EPo is measured by simulating 100
outbreaks per seed node and counting the number which re-
sult in at least half of the network nodes becoming infected.
Continous-time simulations model the time of the next trans-
mission as in the SI model just described, except the trans-
mission rate parameter scales the current number of infected-
susceptile edges by some β in the critical range (see below),
and the time of the next recovery from a unit rate exponential
distribution weighted by the number of infected individuals.
In each round of the discrete-time simulations, transmission
occurs along each infected-susceptible edge with probability
r = − log(1 − β) (standard conversion of rate to probability)
and nodes recovering at the end of the round.
The critical range for β can be defined empirically using the
criterion that if β is in the critical range, then a large majority
of nodes will have EPo ∈ [2%, 98%]. We here set β indepen-
Footline Author PNAS Issue Date Volume Issue Number 5
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dently for each network to a fixed multiple of 1/λ, where λ is
the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix. Similarity in
network structure allows the same multiple to be used for both
the Pareto and Amazon networks, likewise the Astrophysics
and Facebook networks. Internet hyperlinks lie between these
two other classes, and the multiples from the social networks
yields good results. This proceedure resulted in at least 96%
of nodes in continuous-time simulations with EPo in the criti-
cal range; in discrete time the relevant figure is 76% or better
(Table S3).
The networks. The five families of simulated networks are de-
fined by their degree distributions, one theoretical (Pareto),
and four derived from the following empirical human con-
tact networks: the Amazon co-purchase network from May
2003 [31], the graph of Internet hyperlinks from the 2002
Google programming contest [32], the collaboration network
from ArXiv Astrophysics between 1993 and 2003 [26], and
Facebook wall posts from the New Orleans network [33] (Ta-
ble S4). The Pareto and Amazon networks are characterized
by large diameter and low density. The Astrophysics and Face-
book networks are two orders of magnitude more dense and
have correspondingly smaller diameter. Google’s map of In-
ternet hyperlinks lies in between the other two families. The
networks can also be characterized by the largest eigenvalue
of their adjacency matrix, as theory suggests that the crit-
ical disease transmission probability dividing epidemic from
extinction regimes is the inverse of this value [11], which fur-
ther implies that a network’s inherent susceptibility to disease
spreading is reflected by this eigenvalue. Again, the selected
network families cover a wide range of inherent susceptibility
to disease. Simulations are conducted using giant components
of 1,000 nodes. Networks with a Pareto (1,2.3) degree distri-
bution are simulated using the Chung Lu protocol, a versa-
tile and general method for constructing random graphs with
given expected degree sequence [34]. The remaining networks
are simulated by randomly sampling 1,000 values from the de-
gree sequence of the actual graph without replacement and
generating a graph from these values using the Igraph func-
tion “degree.sequence.game” which generates undirected, con-
nected simple graphs matching the input degree sequence [35].
Empirical networks were selected and downloaded from the
Stanford Large Network Repository (SNAP) and Alex Are-
nas’s collection according to the following criteria: having be-
tween 1,000 and 1,000,000 nodes in the largest connencted
component, representing one clear network structure, and, in
the case that the same network is sampled at multiple time-
points, the latest timepoint. Twenty one networks from SNAP
and two from Alex Arena passed these criteria. The simu-
lated Amazon networks are derived from the earliest Amazon
co-purchase network in SNAP. For completeness, this network
is also included in the suite of empirical networks. The Face-
book network was downloaded from the Max Planck Institute
for Software Systems. For the purpose of testing, networks are
treated as undirected graphs with multiple and self-edges re-
moved. The 24 networks are characterized in Table S5, which
includes the internet address of the collections.
The size of the empirical networks required slight modifica-
tions to the overall approach. Seed nodes are 1,000 nodes se-
lected uniformly at random. Epidemics with recovery are sim-
ulated only in discrete time. As can be seen from the results
on the random networks, discrete time simulations provide ap-
proximately the same mean outcome as continuous time, and
only slightly higher variance. The transmission/recovery prob-
ability ratio β is determined independently for each network
by binary search over possible values until one is found such
that a minimum of 80% of tested nodes have EPo between 0.05
and 0.95. When the network has more than 25,000 nodes, the
tthc is measured as the time of the 1,000th transmission rather
than the time when half the network is infected. Finally, the
R software package does not gracefully handle the multiplica-
tion of matrices larger than 25Kx25K, even with the Matrix
package [36]. Hence the accessibility was not computed for
networks with more than 25k nodes.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS. This work was supported out of the general budget of the
Max Planck Society.
1. Danon, L, Ford, A. P, House, T, Jewell, C. P, Keeling, M. J, Roberts, G. O, Ross,
J. V, & Vernon, M. C. (2011) Interdiscip Perspect Infect Dis 2011, 284909.
2. Freeman, L. C. (1979) Soc Networks 1, 215–239.
3. Friedkin, N. (1991) Am J Sociol 96, 1478–1504.
4. Bonacich, P. (1987) American Journal of Sociology 92, 1170–1182.
5. Albert, R & Baraba´si, A.-L. (2002) Reviews of Modern Physics 74, 47–97.
6. Kitsak, M, Gallos, L. K, Havlin, S, Liljeros, F, Muchnik, L, Stanley, H. E, & Makse,
H. a. (2010) Nature Phys 6, 888–893.
7. Bauer, F & Lizier, J. T. (2012) Europhys Lett 99, 68007.
8. Estrada, E & Rodr´ıguez-Vela´zquez, J. A. (2005) Phys Rev E Stat Nonlin Soft Matter
Phys 71, 056103.
9. Sikic, M, Lancic, A, Antulov-Fantulin, N, & Stefancic, H. (2013) The European Phys-
ical Journal B 86, 1–13.
10. Borgatti, S. P. (2005) Social Networks 27, 55–71.
11. Klemm, K, Serrano, M. , Eguluz, V. M, & Miguel, M. S. (2012) Sci Rep 2, 292.
12. Taylor, L. H, Latham, S. M, & Woolhouse, M. E. (2001) Philos Trans R Soc Lond B
Biol Sci 356, 983–989.
13. Reperant, L. A. (2010) Vector Borne Zoonotic Dis 10, 105–110.
14. Christensen, C. M. (1997) The Innovator’s Dilemma: When New Technologies Cause
Great Firms to Fail. (Harvard Business Review Press).
15. Cha, M, Haddadi, H, Benevenuto, F, & Gummadi, K. P. (2010) Measuring User
Influence in Twitter: The Million Follower Fallacy.
16. Travenc¸olo, B & Costa, L. d. F. (2008) Phys Lett A 373, 89–95.
17. Viana, M. P, Batista, J. L. B, & Costa, L. d. F. (2012) Phys Rev E Stat Nonlin Soft
Matter Phys 85, 036105.
18. da Silva, R. A. P, Viana, M. P, & da Fontoura Costa, L. (2012) J Stat Mech Theor
Exp 2012, P07005.
19. Borgatti, S. P & Everett, M. G. (2006) Social Networks 28, 466–484.
20. Estrada, E. (2010) J Theor Biol 263, 556–565.
21. Benzi, M & Klymko, C. (2013).
22. Anderson, R. M & May, R. M. (1992) Infectious Diseases of Humans: Dynamics and
Control. (Oxford University Press).
23. Fountoulakis, N, Panagiotou, K, & Sauerwald, T. (2012) Ultra-fast rumor spreading
in social networks, SODA ’12. (SIAM), pp. 1642–1660.
24. Barabasi, A. L & Albert, R. (1999) Science 286, 509–512.
25. Almaas, E, Kovcs, B, Vicsek, T, Oltvai, Z. N, & Barabsi, A.-L. (2004) Nature 427,
839–843.
26. Leskovec, J, Kleinberg, J. M, & Faloutsos, C. (2007) ACM Trans. Knowl. Discov.
Data 1.
27. Seidman, S. B. (1983) Social Networks 5, 269–287.
28. Costenbader, E & Valente, T. W. (2003) Social Networks 25, 283–307.
29. Ghoshal, G & Barabsi, A. L. (2011) Nat Commun 2, 394.
30. Adiga, A, Kumar, A, & Vullikanti, S. (2013) How robust is the core of a network?
Prague.
31. Leskovec, J, Adamic, L. A, & Huberman, B. A. (2007) ACM Trans. Web 1.
32. Leskovec, J, Lang, K. J, Dasgupta, A, & Mahoney, M. W. (2009) Internet Mathe-
matics 6, 29–123.
33. Viswanath, B, Mislove, A, Cha, M, & Gummadi, K. P. (2009) On the Evolution of
User Interaction in Facebook.
34. Chung, F & Lu, L. (2002) Annals of Combinatorics 6, 125–145.
35. Csardi, G & Nepusz, T. (2006) InterJournal Complex Systems, 1695.
36. Bates, D & Maechler, M. (2012) Matrix: Sparse and Dense Matrix Classes and
Methods. R package version 1.0-10.
6 www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.0709640104 Footline Author
Supplementary materials for “Understanding the spreading power of all nodes in a
network: a continuous-time perspective.”
Glenn Lawyer
Max Planck Institute for Informatics
The Notes and Tables S1-3 support claims made
in the main text. Tables S4-5 describe the net-
works used in the study. Tables S6-9 give the
results of the evaluations in numerical form, du-
plicating the figures in the main text.
Note S1. Incorporating the dynamics of spread.
Borgatti’s 2005 classification of centralities in terms of
network flows observes that centralities often give the
“wrong” answer when applied to a flow which they do not
model, and further claims that many sociologically inter-
esting processes are not well described by existing cen-
tralities [1]. Spreading processes ranked high on this list.
Since then, several approaches have been published which
explicitly seek to incorporate the dynamics of spread into
the walk count. These include the accessibility [2, 3], the
dynamic influence [4], and the impact [5]. The accessi-
bility is a modified form of hierarchical degree which con-
trols for both transmission probabilities and the diversity
of walks of a given fixed length [3]. The dynamic influ-
ence, like the eigenvalue centrality, is the proportion of
infinite walks starting from each node, where walk steps
are scaled such that the linear dynamics of the system
are expected to converge to a non-null steady state [4].
The impact sums, over increasing walk lengths, the prob-
ability of transmission to the end node of the walk and
that the end node has not been previously visited by a
shorter walk [5]. Note that all of these measures are based
on counts of walks.
Note S2. Walk counting imposes a discrete-time
perspective. Walk counting, when understood in terms
of infinte sums, counts all walks of length k before any
of length k + 1. This may make sense for flows char-
acterized by transfer in which the number of “walkers”
remains constant at each time step. It is less applicable
for diffusive flow, in which the number of walkers can
increase at each time step. From an epidemiological per-
spective, ignoring for the moment topological constraints,
it is equally likely that two successive transmissions form
a chain a → b → c as a star a → b, a → d. Yet walk-
counting considers these two cases differently.
Seen from another angle, the structure of walk-
counting is equivalent to imposing a discrete-time per-
spective on a continuous-time process. The potential for
double-exponential growth in the number of transmission
events per discrete time step [6] means that even for small
k, a discrete-time framework induces substantial blur.
Note S3. Motivation for the choice of measures
for comparison. The predictive power of the ExF is
compared to one spreading power metric and two cen-
trality measures. Spreading power metrics are a recent
theme in the centrality literature specifically designed to
quantify the spreading power of all nodes. Spreading
power metrics have consistently been shown to have bet-
ter correlations with epidemic outcomes than previous
centrality measures [4, 5, 7]. The accessibility is chosen
to represent them as it is the most general, most power-
ful, and most theoretically developed published spreading
power metric. In contrast, the authors of the dynamic in-
fluence write that their metric is only accurate when the
actual transmission probability is close to the assumed
optimal value contained in their method [4]. The impact
is not defined for SI models, has a different definition for
SIS than for SIR models, and directly depends on the
transmission probability of a specific spreading process
[5].
Given that almost all centrality measures are based
on sums of walks of various lengths [1, 8–10], and that
the best choice for walk length is influenced by network
topology [5, 8, 11], we here make comparison to the two
measures which represent the endpoints of the spectrum
(see Note S4). The eigenvalue centrality counts the num-
ber of infinite walks, and degree counts walks of length
one. We here compare to the k-shell instead of degree,
as the k-shell can be thought of as the minimal degree
of a node [12], and is a better measure of node influ-
ence [13]. No comparison is made to subgraph centrality
as it is computationally too expensive to compute for
large graphs [14]. No comparison is made to pagerank
because its rankings are highly dependent on the damp-
ing factor, including frequent rank reversals after small
changes [15, 16], and as it is also unstable in the face of
small pertubations in network topology [17].
The eigenvalue centrality and the k-shell are computed
using the Igraph package version 0.6.5 [14]. We imple-
ment the latest version of the accessibility [3] in R, follow-
ing python code supplied by the authors and using sparse
matrix multiplication from the Matrix package version
1.0-10 [18].
Note S4. Centrality measures exist on a spectrum
The concept of centrality as an infinite sum of walks is
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2found as early as Bonacich’s 1987 “Power and Centrality:
a Family of Measures” [19], which proposes a parameter-
ized family of centralities
c(β) =
∞∑
k=0
βkAκ+1 (1)
where A is the network adjacency matrix and k is walk
length. Bonacich explicitly states that β controls the
weighting of local vs global structure, alternately, that
(1 − β)−1 is the radius of interest (when β > 0). This
measure becomes the eigenvalue centrality when β ap-
proaches the inverse of the largest eigenvalue of the ad-
jacency matrix, and the degree when β approaches zero.
Bonacich concludes that the optimal choice of β depends
on the nature of communication and authority in the net-
work [19].
More recently, Estrada has proposed a generalized ver-
sion of the subgraph centrality which allows the user to
set the balance between local and global scale [9]. The
subgraph centrality counts the number of closed walks
for a given node (the number of walks both begining and
ending at that node). These are given for every node
by the trace of the exponential of the adjacency matrix.
Noting that
exp(A) = I +A+
A2
2!
+
A3
3!
+ . . .+
Ak
k!
+ . . . (2)
the subgraph centrality of node i is
Csubgraph(i) =
∞∑
k=0
uk(i)
k!
(3)
where uk(i) is the number of closed walks of length k
starting from node i. The generalized subgraph centrality
is created by shifting the factorial denominators forward
or backward by t steps,
Ctsubgraph(i) =
∞∑
k=0
uk(i)
(k + t)!
(4)
Positive t places more emphasis on local structure, nega-
tive t on global (with the understanding that the factorial
of a negative number is 1) [9].
Benzi and Klymko unite the generalizations proposed
by Bonacich and Estrada [10]. Rescaling the adjacency
matrix allows many centralities (i.e. eigenvalue, Katz,
total communicability) to be expressed in Bonacich’s for-
mat
∞∑
k=0
βkAkR (5)
where AR is the appropriately rescaled adjacency matrix.
Others, i.e. the subgraph centrality, resolvent subgraph
centrality, etc., are expressed in terms of the exponential
of the (potentially rescaled) adjacency matrix, which has
the following power series expansion
∞∑
k=0
(βAR)
k
k!
(6)
Benzi and Klymko further show that both formulas imply
similar behavior as the tuning parameter β approaches its
limit, regardless of the rescaling of the adjacency matrix.
As |β| goes to zero, both formulations converges towards
node degree, while as it approaches its upper limit (1/λ
in the first case, where λ is the largest eigenvalue, and
∞ in the second), the series converges towards the eigen-
value centrality. The rate of convergence depends on the
spectral gap of the adjacency matrix, with a larger gap
corresponding to faster convergence [10].
Note S5. Correlation between ExF2 and ExF3.
The ExF is based on the distribution of the force of in-
fection after an arbitrary number of infection events; a
subscript can be used to indicate the number of events
considered. Evidence that two events is sufficient is pro-
vided by the tight correlation between the metric when
computed using two and again with three events (ExF2
and ExF3) for the simulated network classes considered
here. The mean and standard deviations in the correla-
tions, taken over 50 networks in each class, are as follows:
Pareto 0.96 ± 0.007, Amazon 0.95 ± 0.013, Internet 0.97
± 0.007, Facebook 0.99 ± 0.014, Astrophysics 0.99 ±
0.005. As expected from these tight correlations, increas-
ing the number of events to three does not provide any
meaningful increase in predictive accuracy.
Note S6. Invariance of ExFM to choice of scaling
parameter. The modified version of the ExF is defined
in the main text as:
ExFM (i) = log(αdeg(i))ExF (i)
where the degree of the node is scaled by α so as to pre-
vent the logarithm from being zero for nodes with degree
one. A simple shuffling of terms clarifies the influence
of α: ExFM = log(α)ExF (i) + log(deg(i))ExF (i), im-
plying that as α → 1, the scaling factor becomes irrele-
vant, and as α → ∞, it eclipses any contribution from
the degree. The manuscript suggest α = 2 is a reason-
able choice, providing the needed scaling without unduly
skewing the measure.
We here show that the measure is largely invariant to
the choice of α by testing the following values: 1.0001,
1.001, 1.01, 1.1, 1.5, 2, 3, 4, 8, and 16. For each α tested,
the correlation between ExFM at α = 2 and the test
value is measured. Measurements are made on all non-
hub nodes for one hundred networks of each of the five
simulated network families. The mean value for each
3Table S1. Correlation between ExFM computed
with scaling parameter 2 and with the value given in
the column headings.
1.0001 1.001 1.01 1.1 1.5
Pareto 0.9958 0.9959 0.9960 0.9971 0.9994
Amazon 0.9980 0.9980 0.9981 0.9986 0.9997
Internet 0.9965 0.9965 0.9966 0.9975 0.9995
Facebook 0.9995 0.9995 0.9995 0.9996 0.9999
Astrophysics 0.9996 0.9996 0.9996 0.9997 0.9999
2 3 4 8 16
Pareto 1.0000 0.9992 0.9980 0.9942 0.9899
Amazon 1.0000 0.9996 0.9989 0.9966 0.9939
Internet 1.0000 0.9992 0.9979 0.9931 0.9873
Facebook 1.0000 0.9999 0.9996 0.9987 0.9975
Astrophysics 1.0000 0.9999 0.9997 0.9989 0.9979
parameter/network type is reported in Table S1. We test
over the full network as this is likely to bias the testing
values towards low degree nodes, where the choice of α
is more likely to have an effect.
All correlations are greater than 0.999 for α in the
range 1.5–3. Only two cases show correlation less than
0.99, both occurring when α = 16. If instead of reporting
the mean correlation observed over the one hundred net-
works, we report the minimum, the same patterns hold,
with the lowest value dropping to 0.976, again for α = 16.
Note S7. Running times. Straightforward calculation
of the ExF has time complexity O(n21 ∗n2), where n1 and
n2 are the number of neighbors at geodesic distance one
and two from the seed. It is difficult to analytically com-
pare a time complexity computed on individual nodes
with time complexities whose calculation is based on the
entire adjacency matrix. Simple benchmarking exper-
iments, however, suggest that the ExF scales approxi-
mately linearly in the number of edges and nodes in the
network. We first compare the median running time of
all measures on fifty Pareto networks of 1,000 nodes, with
running time measured at sub-microsecond accuracy [20]
as the median computation time over ten runs on each
network. The k-shell is computed in 0.5% of the time,
and the eigenvalue centrality in 11% of the time needed
to compute the ExF for all non-hub nodes. Computing
the accessibility takes 84 times longer than the ExF. The
benchmarking is then repeated with the same protocol on
10,000 node Pareto networks. Increases in running time
for the k-shell (7x), eigenvalue centrality (9x), and ExF
(16x) have roughly linear correspondence to the tenfold
increase in the number of network nodes. Recall that the
proven time complexity for the k-shell and expected time
for the eigenvalue centrality are both O(|V | + |E|), i.e.
linear. As expected, the accessibility does not scale well,
with a ten-fold increase in network size leading to a 265
Table S2. Pearson’s rank correlation coefficient
between the ExF and the eigenvalue centrality (ev)
and k-shell (ks), along with the mean number of
nodes placed in the top ten by both ExF and
eigenvalue centrality, by network family.
ρ-ev ρ-ks overlap
Pareto 0.62 0.79 6.38
Amazon 0.71 0.61 6.96
Internet 0.73 0.82 9.16
Facebook 0.83 0.90 9.35
Astrophysics 0.84 0.92 9.22
fold increase in median running time. Recall that it is
computed by taking powers of the adjacency matrix, i.e.
something worse than O(|V |2.4). Computation of k-shell
and eigenvalue centrality takes advantage of the highly
optimized code implemented in the Igraph package [14].
The accessibility is computed in native R [21] code us-
ing sparse matrix multiplication from the Matrix package
1.0-10 [18]. The ExF is computed in C++ code via an
R interface.
Note S8. Agreement between the ExF, k-shell,
and eigenvalue centrality on the most important
nodes. We here assess the agreement between the ExF,
k-shell, and eigenvalue centrality as to which nodes are
the most important in the network. All three measures
are compared on one hundred networks for each of the
five families. Table S2 shows the mean rank correla-
tion between ExF and the other measures, as well as
the agreement between ExF and eigenvalue centrality re-
garding the top ten nodes.
Overlap with the k-shell is problematic in that the k-
shell does not provide deep resolution. In the looser net-
works, the highest k-shell contains a large percentage of
the total nodes in the network (mean 41% in Pareto, 92%
in Amazon). Even in the denser networks, the top k-shell
contains more than 10% of the network nodes (Internet
15%, Facebook 13%, Astrophysics 14%). Hence the ob-
servation that the top 10 nodes (1% of the network) as
ranked by the ExF are also found in the highest k-shell
is not sufficiently meaningful to report in the table.
Note S9. Sufficiency of local neighborhood. Re-
liance on a local neighborhood is consistent with estab-
lished theory showing that topological information con-
tent falls off quickly with distance. Bonacich demon-
strated in 1987 that the influence of walks must decay
at least exponentially in walk length to guarantee con-
vergence [19]. More recent work shows that even faster
decay rates are often motivated [9, 10, 22]. The fall-off
in information can also be shown by the following exam-
ple. Consider a long linear chain of nodes which ulti-
4mately connects to a network hub. Let β be the trans-
mission/recovery ratio in a process with recovery and ∆i
the distance from the ith node of the chain to the hub.
If the spreading process reaches the hub, an epidemic is
almost certain. The probability of this occuring is at
best β∆i . For β < 0.1, this probability is estimatable to
three of four decimal places using only local information.
More generally, since epidemic spread is almost instan-
taneous on scale free networks [6, 23], the expectation is
that the time-step which takes a process outside the local
neighborhood of its origin brings it to the majority of the
network.
Note S10. Selection of seed nodes. For each sim-
ulated network, the ExF is computed for all non-hub
nodes, with hubs defined as nodes whose degree is greater
than 60% of the maximum degree node in the network.
The range of observed ExF values is split into 15 equal
width bins. Five seed nodes are selected uniformly at ran-
dom from each bin, giving approximately 75 seed nodes
for each of the hundred simulated networks in each of the
five network families. The reason for the binning is that
in scale free networks, the distribution of any centrality
measure is strongly biased towards low values. Selecting
seed nodes across the full range of the ExF ensures that
nodes with high and medium ExF are also included in
all tests. That hubs have maximal spreading power is
already firmly estalished, and also the reasons why; they
also have the highest ExF values. Further, under this
definition, less than 0.1% of nodes are hubs.
Note S11. Probability of epidemic. This work de-
fines the epidemic outcome in SIS/SIR processes as the
probability that an epidemic occurs. This is in con-
trast to the measure typically used, the mean number
of infected nodes (i.e. [3–5, 7, 11, 13, 24]). We are not
convinced that the mean is a good summary statistic.
In over 20,000 simulated continuous-time SIS spreading
processes, no processes which went extinct reached more
than 20 nodes, while processes which did not go extinct
reached the majority of the network. It has been ar-
gued that such bifurcation in outcomes is predicted by
theory [25]. Given that the distribution of the number
of infected nodes is characterized by two well separated
modes, the mean is best seen as an indirect estimate of
the likelihood of the higher mode. It is this likelihood
which we directly measure as the epidemic potential.
Table S3. Empirical evidence that fixed multiples of
the inverse of the largest eigenvalue give β in the
critical range for epidemic take-off. Percentage of
nodes with epidemic potential in the interval [2%, 98%]
when β is set to the given multiple of the 1/λ (where λ is
the largest eigenvalue of the adjacency matrix), by network
type. Epidemic potential is measured by simulating 100
spreading processes seeded from the given node and
counting how many result in an epidemic. A different
multiple is used for each type of spreading process. Denser
networks require higher multiples.
Pareto/Amazon Internet/Astro/Facebook
multiple percentage multiple percentage
SIS-C 4.0 (100/100)% 8.0 (99/99/98)
SIS-D 2.0 (93/89)% 2.5 (83/81/77)
SIR-C 6.0 (100/100)% 8.0 (99/98/96)
SIR-D 3.5 (83/76)% 5.0 (76/78/81)
Table S4. Simulated network families. The mean
diameter, mean graph density, and empirical middle 65%
quantile range of the largest eigenvalue for the different
network families. Pareto and Amazon co-purchase networks
have a large, loose structure with low eigenvalue, suggesting
less inherent susceptibility to epidemics than the smaller and
more dense collaboration networks; Google’s map of the
Internet lies in between. Means and standard deviations are
computed over 100 simulated networks with 1,000 nodes.
diameter density 65% quantile
Pareto 11.6 ±1.0 3.2 e-04 7.1 – 10.1
Amazon [26] 7.2 ±0.4 6.9 e-04 10.1 – 13.7
Internet [26] 7.0 ±0.5 9.4 e-03 25.2 – 35.2
Astrophysics [27] 5.5 ±0.6 2.1 e-02 54.5 – 61.9
Facebook [28] 5.5 ±0.5 2.4 e-02 65.2 – 73.7
5Table S5. Empirical networks. The number of nodes,
90th percentile effective diameter, and density of the
empirical networks. Networks were downloaded from the
Stanford Large Network Collection (SNAP), Alex Arena’s
collection (AA), and the Max Planck Institute for Software
Systems website (MPI), which in turn credit the cited
publication for the network.
nodes diameter density source
PGPgiantcompo 10680 10.0 4.26 e-4 AA [29]
amazon0302 262111 11.1 0.26 e-4 SNAP [26]
amazon0601 403364 7.6 0.30 e-4 SNAP [26]
ca-AstroPh 17903 5.0 12.30 e-4 SNAP [27]
ca-CondMat 21363 6.5 4.01 e-4 SNAP [27]
ca-GrQc 4158 7.6 15.53 e-4 SNAP [27]
ca-HepPh 11204 5.8 18.74 e-4 SNAP [27]
ca-HepTh 8638 7.4 6.65 e-4 SNAP [27]
cit-HepPh 34401 5.0 7.11 e-4 SNAP [30]
cit-HepTh 27400 5.3 9.38 e-4 SNAP [30]
com-dblp 317080 8.0 0.21 e-4 SNAP [31]
email-EuAll 224832 4.5 0.13 e-4 SNAP [27]
email-Uni 1133 4.3 85.00 e-4 AA [32]
facebooklcc 59691 5.6 4.09 e-4 MPI [28]
loc-brightkite 56739 6.0 1.32 e-4 SNAP [33]
loc-gowalla 196591 5.7 0.49 e-4 SNAP [33]
p2p-Gnutella31 62561 6.7 0.76 e-4 SNAP [27]
soc-Epinions1 75877 5.0 1.41 e-4 SNAP [34]
soc-Slashdot0902 82168 4.7 1.49 e-4 SNAP [35]
soc-sign-epinions 119130 4.9 0.99 e-4 SNAP [36]
web-Google 855802 8.1 0.12 e-4 SNAP [35]
web-NotreDame 325729 9.4 0.21 e-4 SNAP [37]
web-Stanford 255265 9.7 0.60 e-4 SNAP [35]
wiki-Vote 7066 3.8 40.36 e-4 SNAP [36]
SNAP http://snap.stanford.edu/data/index.html
AA http://deim.urv.cat/∼aarenas/data/welcome.htm
MPI http://socialnetworks.mpi-sws.org/data-wosn2009.html
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Results tables on following pages
7Table S6. Mean correlations between node spreading power metrics and epidemic outcomes on each
type of spreading process on the simulated networks, by network model. Shown is the mean and standard
error in correlations measured on one hundred networks from each family. This information is duplicated in Figure
2 in the main text. ExFM is not included for SI models as the modification only makes sense for processes with
recovery. Spreading processes are suffixed to indicate simulations in continuous (-C) or discrete (-D) time. Epidemic
outcomes are time to half coverage for SI processes and epidemic potential in the remaining processes.
ExF ExFM accesibility eigenvalue cent. k-shell
Pareto
SI 0.84 ± 0.04 0.66 ± 0.05 0.38 ± 0.06 0.76 ± 0.05
SIS-C 0.93 ± 0.02 0.89 ± 0.02 0.78 ± 0.05 0.53 ± 0.08 0.77 ± 0.05
SIS-D 0.94 ± 0.02 0.91 ± 0.02 0.78 ± 0.06 0.51 ± 0.09 0.79 ± 0.05
SIR-C 0.91 ± 0.02 0.81 ± 0.03 0.71 ± 0.05 0.43 ± 0.08 0.82 ± 0.03
SIR-D 0.87 ± 0.14 0.78 ± 0.13 0.68 ± 0.12 0.40 ± 0.09 0.82 ± 0.14
Amazon
SI 0.87 ± 0.02 0.84 ± 0.02 0.44 ± 0.05 0.88 ± 0.02
SIS-C 0.95 ± 0.01 0.92 ± 0.01 0.91 ± 0.02 0.63 ± 0.06 0.72 ± 0.05
SIS-D 0.95 ± 0.01 0.91 ± 0.02 0.92 ± 0.03 0.59 ± 0.06 0.74 ± 0.06
SIR-C 0.92 ± 0.02 0.85 ± 0.02 0.88 ± 0.03 0.53 ± 0.05 0.82 ± 0.04
SIR-D 0.90 ± 0.02 0.81 ± 0.03 0.87 ± 0.04 0.46 ± 0.06 0.87 ± 0.04
Internet
SI 0.82 ± 0.03 0.77 ± 0.08 0.37 ± 0.04 0.73 ± 0.04
SIS-C 0.92 ± 0.03 0.90 ± 0.01 0.61 ± 0.09 0.65 ± 0.04 0.95 ± 0.01
SIS-D 0.85 ± 0.03 0.96 ± 0.01 0.45 ± 0.08 0.82 ± 0.04 0.89 ± 0.03
SIR-C 0.92 ± 0.02 0.90 ± 0.01 0.62 ± 0.09 0.66 ± 0.04 0.95 ± 0.01
SIR-D 0.89 ± 0.03 0.87 ± 0.02 0.60 ± 0.09 0.60 ± 0.04 0.98 ± 0.01
Astrophysics
SI 0.81 ± 0.02 0.51 ± 0.07 0.36 ± 0.03 0.6 ± 0.04
SIS-C 0.92 ± 0.01 0.94 ± 0.01 0.31 ± 0.05 0.71 ± 0.02 0.95 ± 0.01
SIS-D 0.85 ± 0.02 0.97 ± 0 0.2 ± 0.04 0.86 ± 0.03 0.96 ± 0.01
SIR-C 0.92 ± 0.01 0.94 ± 0.01 0.31 ± 0.05 0.71 ± 0.02 0.95 ± 0.01
SIR-D 0.89 ± 0.01 0.92 ± 0.01 0.29 ± 0.05 0.67 ± 0.03 0.97 ± 0.01
Facebook
SI 0.83 ± 0.02 0.43 ± 0.1 0.38 ± 0.02 0.61 ± 0.04
SIS-C 0.9 ± 0.02 0.95 ± 0.01 0.22 ± 0.05 0.73 ± 0.02 0.95 ± 0.01
SIS-D 0.82 ± 0.02 0.97 ± 0 0.14 ± 0.04 0.87 ± 0.02 0.97 ± 0.01
SIR-C 0.9 ± 0.02 0.95 ± 0.01 0.22 ± 0.05 0.73 ± 0.02 0.95 ± 0.01
SIR-D 0.87 ± 0.02 0.94 ± 0.01 0.2 ± 0.05 0.7 ± 0.03 0.97 ± 0.01
8Table S7. Correlation between spreading power metrics and tthc in real world networks. Shown is the
estimated correlation from 1,000 nodes on the given network, along with the 95% confidence bounds of the estimate.
This information is duplicated in Figure 3 in the main text. The ExFM is not included here as the modification
only makes sense for processes with recovery; an empty column is used to allow easier visual comparison with the
remaining tables. Accessibility is not measured for networks with more than 25,000 nodes.
ExF ExFM accessibility eigenvalue cent. k-shell
PGPgiantcompo 0.69 ± 0.03 – 0.58 ± 0.04 0.19 ± 0.06 0.43 ± 0.05
amazon0302 0.54 ± 0.04 – – 0.15 ± 0.06 0.30 ± 0.06
amazon0601 0.74 ± 0.03 – – 0.09 ± 0.06 0.63 ± 0.04
ca-AstroPh 0.84 ± 0.02 – 0.49 ± 0.05 0.29 ± 0.06 0.58 ± 0.04
ca-CondMat 0.84 ± 0.02 – 0.53 ± 0.04 0.26 ± 0.06 0.65 ± 0.04
ca-GrQc 0.78 ± 0.02 – 0.58 ± 0.04 0.16 ± 0.06 0.36 ± 0.05
ca-HepPh 0.82 ± 0.02 – 0.54 ± 0.04 0.20 ± 0.06 0.39 ± 0.05
ca-HepTh 0.78 ± 0.02 – 0.56 ± 0.04 0.05 ± 0.06 0.47 ± 0.05
cit-HepPh 0.82 ± 0.02 – – 0.28 ± 0.06 0.68 ± 0.03
cit-HepTh 0.84 ± 0.02 – 0.57 ± 0.04 0.38 ± 0.05 0.64 ± 0.04
com-dblp 0.79 ± 0.02 – – 0.05 ± 0.06 0.36 ± 0.05
email-EuAll 0.41 ± 0.05 – – 0.34 ± 0.05 0.50 ± 0.05
email-Uni 0.92 ± 0.01 – 0.61 ± 0.04 0.56 ± 0.04 0.84 ± 0.02
facebooklcc 0.86 ± 0.02 – – 0.19 ± 0.06 0.59 ± 0.04
loc-brightkite 0.79 ± 0.02 – – 0.13 ± 0.06 0.54 ± 0.04
loc-gowalla 0.66 ± 0.03 – – 0.25 ± 0.06 0.53 ± 0.04
p2p-Gnutella31 0.94 ± 0.01 – 0.72 ± 0.03 0.53 ± 0.04 0.92 ± 0.01
soc-Epinions1 0.80 ± 0.02 – – 0.33 ± 0.06 0.47 ± 0.05
soc-Slashdot0902 0.84 ± 0.02 – – 0.42 ± 0.05 0.60 ± 0.04
soc-sign-epinions 0.81 ± 0.02 – – 0.29 ± 0.06 0.47 ± 0.05
web-Google 0.69 ± 0.02 – – 0.07 ± 0.04 0.59 ± 0.02
web-NotreDame 0.43 ± 0.05 – – 0.18 ± 0.06 0.26 ± 0.06
web-Stanford 0.25 ± 0.06 – – 0.06 ± 0.06 0.12 ± 0.06
wiki-Vote 0.86 ± 0.02 – 0.50 ± 0.05 0.50 ± 0.05 0.72 ± 0.03
9Table S8. Correlation between spreading power metrics and epidemic potential in discrete time SIS
processes on real world networks. Shown is the estimated correlation from 1,000 nodes on the given network,
along with the 95% confidence bounds of the estimate. This information is duplicated in Figure 3 in the main text.
Accessibility is not measured for networks with more than 25,000 nodes.
ExF ExFM accessibility eigenvalue cent. k-shell
PGPgiantcompo 0.87 ± 0.02 0.91 ± 0.01 0.62 ± 0.04 0.33 ± 0.06 0.77 ± 0.03
amazon0302 0.79 ± 0.02 0.80 ± 0.02 – 0.12 ± 0.06 0.51 ± 0.05
amazon0601 0.77 ± 0.03 0.87 ± 0.02 – -0.01 ± 0.06 0.68 ± 0.03
ca-AstroPh 0.94 ± 0.01 0.92 ± 0.01 0.51 ± 0.05 0.41 ± 0.05 0.83 ± 0.02
ca-CondMat 0.93 ± 0.01 0.92 ± 0.01 0.59 ± 0.04 0.35 ± 0.05 0.85 ± 0.02
ca-GrQc 0.92 ± 0.01 0.92 ± 0.01 0.52 ± 0.05 0.25 ± 0.06 0.7 ± 0.03
ca-HepPh 0.92 ± 0.01 0.90 ± 0.01 0.51 ± 0.05 0.28 ± 0.06 0.55 ± 0.04
ca-HepTh 0.92 ± 0.01 0.93 ± 0.01 0.64 ± 0.04 0.10 ± 0.06 0.72 ± 0.03
cit-HepPh 0.93 ± 0.01 0.94 ± 0.01 0.55 ± 0.04 0.38 ± 0.05 0.93 ± 0.01
cit-HepTh 0.93 ± 0.01 0.93 ± 0.01 0.71 ± 0.03 0.57 ± 0.04 0.90 ± 0.01
com-dblp 0.90 ± 0.01 0.55 ± 0.03 – 0.08 ± 0.04 0.55 ± 0.03
email-EuAll 0.36 ± 0.05 0.9 ± 0.01 – 0.64 ± 0.04 0.85 ± 0.02
email-Uni 0.95 ± 0.01 0.97 ± 0.00 0.61 ± 0.04 0.75 ± 0.03 0.97 ± 0.00
facebooklcc 0.93 ± 0.01 0.94 ± 0.01 – 0.31 ± 0.06 0.88 ± 0.01
loc-brightkite 0.85 ± 0.02 0.95 ± 0.01 0.58 ± 0.04 0.29 ± 0.06 0.85 ± 0.02
loc-gowalla 0.68 ± 0.03 0.91 ± 0.01 – 0.51 ± 0.05 0.89 ± 0.01
p2p-Gnutella31 0.95 ± 0.01 0.97 ± 0.00 0.83 ± 0.02 0.68 ± 0.03 0.92 ± 0.01
soc-Epinions1 0.77 ± 0.03 0.96 ± 0.01 – 0.63 ± 0.04 0.85 ± 0.02
soc-Slashdot0902 0.80 ± 0.02 0.97 ± 0.00 – 0.71 ± 0.03 0.93 ± 0.01
soc-sign-epinions 0.76 ± 0.03 0.96 ± 0.01 – 0.54 ± 0.04 0.81 ± 0.02
web-Google 0.79 ± 0.02 0.93 ± 0.01 – 0.10 ± 0.06 0.91 ± 0.01
web-NotreDame 0.73 ± 0.03 0.92 ± 0.01 – 0.34 ± 0.06 0.49 ± 0.05
web-Stanford 0.70 ± 0.03 0.89 ± 0.01 – 0.38 ± 0.05 0.77 ± 0.03
wiki-Vote 0.94 ± 0.01 0.96 ± 0.01 0.48 ± 0.05 0.71 ± 0.03 0.95 ± 0.01
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Table S9. Correlation between spreading power metrics and epidemic potential in discrete time SIR
processes on real world networks. Shown is the estimated correlation from 1,000 nodes on the given network,
along with the 95% confidence bounds of the estimate. This information is duplicated in Figure 3 in the main text.
Accessibility is not measured for networks with more than 25,000 nodes.
ExF ExFM accessibility eigenvalue cent. k-shell
PGPgiantcompo 0.82 ± 0.02 0.86 ± 0.02 0.69 ± 0.03 0.36 ± 0.05 0.73 ± 0.03
amazon0302 0.67 ± 0.03 0.65 ± 0.04 – 0.19 ± 0.06 0.33 ± 0.06
amazon0601 0.75 ± 0.03 0.83 ± 0.02 – -0.03 ± 0.06 0.71 ± 0.03
ca-AstroPh 0.94 ± 0.01 0.93 ± 0.01 0.53 ± 0.04 0.42 ± 0.05 0.84 ± 0.02
ca-CondMat 0.92 ± 0.01 0.91 ± 0.01 0.65 ± 0.04 0.38 ± 0.05 0.83 ± 0.02
ca-GrQc 0.85 ± 0.02 0.83 ± 0.02 0.65 ± 0.04 0.27 ± 0.06 0.55 ± 0.04
ca-HepPh 0.91 ± 0.01 0.91 ± 0.01 0.53 ± 0.04 0.31 ± 0.06 0.59 ± 0.04
ca-HepTh 0.89 ± 0.01 0.88 ± 0.01 0.70 ± 0.03 0.10 ± 0.06 0.64 ± 0.04
cit-HepPh 0.93 ± 0.01 0.94 ± 0.01 0.56 ± 0.04 0.39 ± 0.05 0.94 ± 0.01
cit-HepTh 0.93 ± 0.01 0.92 ± 0.01 0.70 ± 0.03 0.54 ± 0.04 0.87 ± 0.01
com-dblp 0.89 ± 0.01 0.55 ± 0.03 – 0.08 ± 0.04 0.53 ± 0.03
email-EuAll 0.31 ± 0.06 0.87 ± 0.02 – 0.60 ± 0.04 0.81 ± 0.02
email-Uni 0.94 ± 0.01 0.97 ± 0.00 0.63 ± 0.04 0.81 ± 0.02 0.96 ± 0.00
facebooklcc 0.93 ± 0.01 0.95 ± 0.01 – 0.32 ± 0.06 0.89 ± 0.01
loc-brightkite 0.84 ± 0.02 0.95 ± 0.01 0.61 ± 0.04 0.31 ± 0.06 0.87 ± 0.02
loc-gowalla 0.68 ± 0.03 0.90 ± 0.01 – 0.47 ± 0.05 0.86 ± 0.02
p2p-Gnutella31 0.96 ± 0.00 0.97 ± 0.00 0.84 ± 0.02 0.68 ± 0.03 0.94 ± 0.01
soc-Epinions1 0.77 ± 0.03 0.96 ± 0.01 – 0.64 ± 0.04 0.85 ± 0.02
soc-Slashdot0902 0.82 ± 0.02 0.96 ± 0.00 – 0.69 ± 0.03 0.91 ± 0.01
soc-sign-epinions 0.76 ± 0.03 0.96 ± 0.01 – 0.54 ± 0.04 0.81 ± 0.02
web-Google 0.79 ± 0.02 0.91 ± 0.01 – 0.10 ± 0.06 0.86 ± 0.02
web-NotreDame 0.61 ± 0.04 0.80 ± 0.02 – 0.31 ± 0.06 0.44 ± 0.05
web-Stanford 0.68 ± 0.03 0.78 ± 0.02 – 0.37 ± 0.05 0.65 ± 0.04
wiki-Vote 0.93 ± 0.01 0.96 ± 0.00 0.48 ± 0.05 0.71 ± 0.03 0.95 ± 0.01
